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 Examines the effects of legal system and property rights protection on inbound 
tourism.  
 Considers various geographical and macroeconomic controls.  
 Includes multiple sub-indexes of the legal system and property rights.   
 The efficiency of the legal system and property rights protection is positively 
associated with inbound tourism.  




The effectiveness of the legal system and inbound tourism 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impacts of the effectiveness of the legal system and protection of 
the property rights on tourism development using a panel data of 152 countries over the 
period 1995–2015. The paper considers the fixed-effects, Hausman–Taylor (HT), and system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations and the results demonstrate that a higher 
level of legal system quality and better protection of property rights promote inbound tourism. 
Specifically, the results show that higher judicial independence and better enforcement of 
contracts enhance the development of tourism. The benchmark results are robust to focus on 
the different groups of countries and measures for tourism development as well as to exclude 
the outlier observations. 
 











There is abundant literature investigating the determinants of inbound tourism from a variety 
of perspectives. Various cultural variables, macroeconomic indicators, and travel health risks 
are used as possible drivers of the inbound tourism indicators (see e.g., Crouch, 1994; Dwyer 
and Forsyth, 1993; Kubickova, 2019; Lorde and Jackman, 2013; Peng et al., 2014; Song et al., 
2009 & 2012; Saha and Yap, 2014 & 2015; Wang, 2009). However, these factors do not 
adequately explain international tourism inflows in destination countries. The literature also 
embraces another dimension which focuses on the quality of institutions. The institutions are 
of critical economic significance to the operations of all economic sectors (Davis and 
Trebilcock, 2001). In the tourism sector, for instance, low quality of institutions increases 
uncertainty and transaction costs and influences the reputation of tourism destinations. The 
existing literature is mostly comprised of case studies examining the institutional mechanism 
in the tourism industry. Only a few studies have conducted cross-country research 
investigating the economy-wide institutional factors in affecting tourist inflows and revenues 
derived from international tourism (Das and Dirienzo, 2009; Nunkoo et al., 2012; Saha et al., 
2017; Su and Lin, 2014). In line with this literature, we aim to examine the impact of informal 
institutions on tourism development. The main hypothesis of this paper is that the 
effectiveness of the legal system promotes the development of the tourism sector. 
The existing literature has explored the “the institutional quality” dimension but 
mainly examines the informal institutions, which are unmodified social norms, customs, and 
beliefs (Holmes et al., 2013; Marano et al., 2016; Williamson, 2000). There is a lack of papers 
investigating the formal institutions, which consist of formal laws, regulations, and policies 
(North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Therefore, we mainly focus on formal legal institutions and 
their effects on inbound tourism. Legal institutions play a significant and independent role in 
economic development in both developed and developing countries as they are supposed to 
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protect the civil rights of individuals from the assertive manners (Davis and Trebilcock, 
2001). Furthermore, an economically efficient legal system can affect the tourism industry 
through various channels, such as the business costs of crime, enforcement of contracts, 
impartial courts, the integrity of the legal system, judicial independence, military interference 
in the rule of law and politics, protection of property rights, regulatory restrictions on the sale 
of real property, and reliability of the police.  
At this juncture, to the best of our knowledge, there is no paper in the literature that 
analyses how the efficiency of the legal system affects tourism development via quantitative 
data. Our paper aims to contribute to the literature by filling this gap via a carefully-designed 
quantitative method using a dataset with a greater period and higher cross-sections 
(countries). For this purpose, we focus on the panel dataset of 152 countries for the period 
from 1995 to 2015 to investigate the effects of the index of the legal system and the protection 
of property rights (including its various measures) on the number of tourist arrivals and the 
tourism receipts. We utilize several panel data estimation techniques and implement various 
robustness checks to achieve the objective of the paper. We observe that a higher quality of 
the legal system and better protection of property rights enhance inbound tourism.  
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the literature 
review. Section 3 clarifies data, econometric estimation procedure, and empirical model. 
Section 4 represents empirical findings. Section 5 implements the robustness analysis of the 
baseline findings. Section 6 argues the potential implications of the findings. The last section 
provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Previous literature 
Several papers have found that national culture plays a major part in determining the 
perception of corruption and crime by employing Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Achim, 
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2016; Davis and Ruhe, 2003). Geographical attributes, such as the coastline per total land 
area, landlocked countries, total land area, and the total surface area are influential factors in 
inbound tourism (Bigano et al., 2007; Llorca-Rodríguez et al., 2019). Furthermore, exchange 
rate, trade openness, and GDP per capita have been reported to affect tourism development as 
well (Blake et al., 2006; Dritsakis, 2004; Kim et al., 2006). At the same time, climate change 
and natural disasters are contributing to the downturn in the worldwide tourism (Gossling and 
Hall, 2006; Hall, 2010).  
Corruption, a leading indicator of informal institutional quality, is also of great 
concern in relation to their impact on tourism development (Das and Dirienzo, 2010; Demir 
and Gozgor, 2017; Lv and Xu, 2017; Propawe, 2015; Saha and Yap, 2015). Considering the 
fixed-effects and dynamic GMM estimations, Neumayer (2004) observes that conflict, human 
rights violations and political violence are negatively related to tourism development in more 
than 100 countries.  
In addition, crime is a significant driver of inbound tourism. For example, using the 
time-series analysis and the monthly dataset, Moyo and Ziramba (2013) show that measures 
of crime negatively affect inbound tourism in South Africa for the period from March 2003 to 
April 2011. Altindag (2014) finds the negative impact of crime on international tourism 
revenue and the number of tourist arrivals in the panel dataset of 35 European countries for 
the period from 1996 to 2003. Mehmood et al. (2016) also observe that there is a dynamic and 
a negative relationship between the crime and inbound tourism in the United States (U.S.) for 
the period from 1984 to 2013. Santana-Gallego et al. (2017) demonstrate that both crime and 
terrorism are negatively associated with the international tourist arrivals in the panel dataset of 
171 countries for the period from 1995 to 2013.  
From an institutional lens, the impact of institutional quality on tourism development 
has also been investigated to some extent. For example, there are several papers that analyse 
7 
 
press freedom, a representative indicator for the quality of institutions that can significantly 
affect tourism indicators (Demir and Gozgor, 2019; Das and Dirienzo, 2009). Balli et al. 
(2016) also find that the economic freedom and the index of civil liberty are the significant 
variables in choosing the destination country based on a pooling dataset of 34 OECD 
countries and lower income economies for the period from 1995 to 2010. Similarly, Saha et 
al. (2017) investigate the effects of civil liberties on inbound tourism and report that the index 
of civil liberties promotes inbound tourism.  
To the best of our knowledge, the prior literature focuses on the indicators of informal 
institutional quality such as democracy, economic freedom, civil liberty and trust and power 
as aforementioned, rather than indicators of formal institutional quality except Detotto et al. 
(2017) and Gozgor et al. (2017). Detotto et al. (2017) conduct a cross-country study to 
examine the relationship between good governance and the performance of the tourism 
industry based on a dataset of 100 countries between 2002 and 2012. Gozgor et al. (2017) 
analyse the impact of the military interference in the rule of law and politics on tourist inflows 
from 71 countries in Turkey using the panel dataset for the period from 1984 to 2014. It is 
noteworthy to emphasize that neither has paid sufficient attention to the legal system and its 
impact on the tourism industry. According to Gray (1991) and Rausser (1992), the economic 
vigour of a country requires the establishment of a legal system (including rules, procedures, 
and institutions) in which legal rights, especially property and contractual rights, are enforced 
and protected. The informal rules and institutions may serve as substitutes for the legal 
enforcement and protection of property and contract rights but with hidden cumulative costs 
(Posner, 1998). As a result, the legal system itself, other than the informal substitutes, should 
be explored as well. The existing literature lacks a comprehensive capture of the various 
aspects of the legal system.  
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In this paper, in order to fill in this gap, we follow the literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 
2015) to measure (indices of the legal system and the protection of property rights) and to 
consider a wider range of legal institutional qualities and their effect on inbound tourism. 
Specifically, we consider the measures of indicators of the efficiency of the legal system, such 
as the enforcement of contracts, judicial independence, impartial courts, the integrity of the 
legal system, the protection of property rights and regulatory restrictions on the sale of real 
property, business costs of crime and reliability of the police as well as the military 
interference in the rule of law and politics. 
Furthermore, previous papers have generally applied the fixed-effects estimations; 
however, we use various panel data estimators. We also consider both time-invariant and 
time-variant controls, analyse the economies at different income levels, employ different 
indicators of institutional quality and tourism development, and exclude the outlier 
observations. In this backdrop, we aim to fill those gaps in the literature by utilizing several 
econometric methods. 
 
3. Data, empirical model, and econometric estimations procedure 
3.1. Data  
The paper includes an unbalanced panel dataset over the period 1995–2015 in 152 countries.1 
We also consider 88 high-income economies and 64 low-income economies following the 
income classification of the World Bank in 2018. A list of countries is reported in Appendix 
A.  
 The data for the index of the legal system and protection of property rights are 
collected from the Economic Freedom dataset of Fraser Institute provided by Gwartney et al. 
(2018). According to Gwartney et al. (2018), the legal system and the security of the property 
                                                          
1 Note that the EFW dataset does not provide the indices of legal effectiveness in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. 
Therefore, the dataset includes the data for 1995 as well as from 2000 to 2015. 
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rights are the most important function of government and the protection of the rights of 
individuals and property is the key element of economic freedom. Specifically, an efficient 
legal system should provide not only the rule of law and the protection of property rights but 
also an independent and unbiased judicial system as well impartial and effective enforcement 
of the contracts (Voigt et al., 2015). The index of the legal system and the security of property 
captures the average of nine indicators: “i) judicial independence, ii) impartial courts, iii) 
protection of property rights, iv) military interference in rule of law and politics, v) integrity 
of the legal system, vi) legal enforcement of contracts, vii) regulatory costs of the sale of real 
property, viii) reliability of police, ix) business costs of crime.” The index values of those 
variables, which measure the efficiency of the legal system and security of property rights, are 
also adjusted to reflect inequalities in the legal treatment of women. In short, the index of the 
legal system and the security of property rights in the Economic Freedom in the World (EFW) 
dataset provides comprehensive and comparable measures for the quality of legal institutions 
in various countries. In the related dataset, 10 and 0 are the maximum and the minimum 
scores and higher scores indicate the higher efficiency of the legal system and the security of 
property rights. 
 According to the data, the efficiency scores of the legal system and the security of 
property rights are changing over time and across countries. For instance, South Africa 
improved scores while Brazil experienced a fall over the decade. The dependent variable of 
the empirical model is the number of tourist arrivals (in millions) (i.e. inbound tourism), and 
the related data are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the 
World Bank (2019). We also use another indicator of inbound tourism that is the tourism 
receipts from international inbound visitors (million current U.S. Dollars), including payments 
to national carriers for international transport (World Bank, 2019). 
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Following the previous literature, various controls are also considered. Specifically, 
we consider macroeconomic indicators, such as the GDP per capita (current U.S. Dollars), 
nominal exchange rate (official exchange rate domestic currency per U.S. Dollars), and 
(nominal) trade openness. These data are collected from the WDI database. We also consider 
geographical control variables, such as the coastline (km), the coastline per total land area, 
landlocked countries (dummy variable if a country is landlocked, it is equal to one, otherwise 
it is zero), total land area (km2), and total surface area (km2). These data are obtained from the 
World Fact Book database of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). All of these variables 
are considered in the natural logarithm form in the estimations. Finally, we consider the 
number of heritage since inclusion in the World Heritage List can attract more tourists, and 
thus it can also be a significant driver of the inbound tourism (Huang et al., 2012). The related 
data for the World Heritage List are collected from the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization. In addition, descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 [Insert Table 1 around here] 
3.2. Empirical model  
Following the previous papers (e.g. Balli et al., 2016; Gholipour et al., 2016), we estimate the 
following model specifications to determine inbound tourism: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡                                              (1) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡             (2) 
In Equations (1) and (2), i denotes the countries and t denotes the period under 
concern. 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 is log international tourist arrivals. 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 is lagged log tourist 
arrivals and captures the "persistence effect", that is tourists have gone to a place and they 
may have a desire to visit the same place once again (Gallego et al., 2019). 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the 
log of the legal system and the property rights index. In addition, we consider the index of the 
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legal system and property rights in the panel data estimation. Finally,  denotes “vector of 
controls”.  represents an error-term. 
3.3. Estimation procedures 
Mainly, we estimate the equations above by implementing the fixed-effects estimators and 
their consistency have been checked by Hausman test. Given that the robust standard-errors 
(clustered at country level) are used, implementing a traditional Hausman test can create the 
size distortions. Therefore, we run the “robust Hausman test” in order to avoid potential size 
distortions.  
In some cases, fixed-effects estimators can be weak since they ignore time-invariant 
tourism variables. At this point, the paper implements the estimator of Hausman and Taylor 
(1981), aka the HT estimations, which also captures the time-invariant variables. In short, we 
implement both the fixed-effects and the HT econometric methods to handle potential 
“omitted variable bias” in estimations. 
Furthermore, the fixed-effects estimations assume a “strict exogeneity” that is valid 
when we do not have any lagged dependent variables in the fixed-effect estimations. 
Specifically, there could be endogeneity issues, which terminate the strict exogeneity 
assumption. Using the system GMM estimations proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), we address potential endogeneity issues. Specifically, there could 
be an endogeneity bias (also known as the omitted variable bias) which is caused by the 
exclusion of lagged tourist arrivals as the right-side variable. Indeed, past tourist arrivals can 
significantly affect the current tourist arrivals the, issue known as the persistence effect. To 
put it differently, inbound tourism can be persistent over the period under concern (Gallego et 
al., 2019).  
The empirical model in Eq. (2) is estimated by the system GMM estimation technique 
since it is able to eliminate the potential problems of the autocorrelation and the presence of 
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different orders of integration in the panel datasets. We also run the two-stage estimation 
procedure with the consistent estimators to avoid potential multicollinearity between controls. 
The instruments are collapsed, as this is recommended by Roodman (2009), two assumptions 
must be fulfilled to yield the efficient results in the estimations. The first assumption is that 
instruments have to be uncorrelated to the error term. Secondly, instruments have to be 
correlated with instrumented variables. In this regard, we need to find the evidence in favour 
of the first-order autocorrelation in the residuals; however, second-order autocorrelation must 
be rejected. Furthermore, the Sargan test statistic must not reject the null hypothesis in order 
to avoid potential over-identification problem. We include time fixed-effects when we run the 
system GMM estimators and address the potential unobservable heterogeneity since there 
could be other heterogeneities across the countries during the coverage period that can drive 
tourism indicators. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
Findings from baseline (fixed-effects) regressions for the impact of the legal system and 
property rights on the number of tourist arrivals are reported in Table 2. 
 [Insert Table 2 around here] 
 The findings of the robust Hausman test show that findings from the fixed-effects 
estimators are consistent. Specifically, Column I report findings of a direct impact of the legal 
system and property rights (in the log) on the number of tourist arrivals (in the log) without 
considering controls. The direction of the relationship is positive and significant (0.54) and a 
high level of the legal system and property rights yield to a higher level of tourist arrivals.  
Column II provides the findings of the impact of the legal system and property rights 
on the number of tourist arrivals by adding macroeconomic controls. Findings in Columns 
(III) to (V) control not only for macroeconomic control variables but also geographical 
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indicators and the number of heritage. Finally, as an alternative, the findings in Column (VI) 
use the “level form” of the legal system and the property rights index rather than the legal 
system and the property rights index in the “logarithmic form”. We find the positive and the 
statistically significant impact of the legal system and the property rights index on the tourist 
arrivals is valid when we use different controls and specifications of the legal system and 
property rights index. Put it differently, the main evidence is also statistically robust as we 
include several control variables. Specifically, the baseline finding in Column (III) indicates 
that a 1% rise in the legal system and property rights index yields to a 0.18% higher inbound 
tourism. 
 When we look at the control variables, the per capita income, nominal exchange rate, 
and trade openness are positively associated with the tourist arrivals, as expected. If income 
per capita rises, a country can attract a higher number of tourists. The positive impact of 
nominal exchange rate means that as a domestic currency gets cheaper, a country attracts a 
higher number of tourists. The positive impact of trade openness indicates that greater 
economic relationships with foreign countries are positively associated with the number of 
tourists. These results are in parallel with the previous results for inbound tourism (Balli et al., 
2016; Gholipour et al., 2016). In addition, that number of heritage in the World Heritage List 
is positively related to inbound tourism, but its coefficient is not significant. This evidence 
indicates that the number of heritage has a trivial impact on tourists’ decisions when they 
choose visiting destinations, in line with the previous results of Huang et al. (2012). 
 Furthermore, the findings of the impact of the legal system and property rights index 
on the tourist arrivals in low-income and lower-middle-income economies as well as in the 
upper middle income and high-income economies are reported in Table 3. In addition, the 
findings from the impact of the legal system and property rights index on the tourist arrivals 
in the non-OECD countries and the OECD countries are provided in Table 3. 
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[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 Columns (I) and (II) provide the findings in the low-income and lower-middle-income 
economies and Columns (III) and (IV) provide the findings in the upper-middle income and 
high-income economies. Columns (V) and (VI) provide findings from the non-OECD 
countries and Columns (VII) and (VIII) provide findings from the OECD countries. Findings 
from the robust Hausman test show that the findings from fixed-effects estimators are 
consistent. All of these findings are in line with the baseline evidence that is the legal system 
and the property rights index is positively associated with the number of tourist arrivals, not 
only in the low-income and lower-middle-income economies and the upper-middle income 
and high-income economies but also the non-OECD and OECD countries. The evidence is 
robust to consider different indicators of the legal system and the property rights index but the 
level form of coefficient in the legal system and the property rights index is statistically 
significant at the 10% level in all groups of countries. In addition, we observe that the impact 
of the legal system and property rights index is higher in the low-income and lower-middle-
income economies than the upper-middle income and high-income economies. Similarly, the 
impact of the legal system and property rights index is greater in non-OECD countries than in 
OECD economies. This evidence implies that achieving a higher level of legal system and 
property rights is especially a significant tool for the policymakers of the poorer economies to 
attract a higher number of tourists. 
The findings of the baseline findings of the impact of the sub-indicators of the legal 
system and property rights measure on the number of tourist arrivals are reported in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
The findings from the robust Hausman test show that the findings of the fixed-effects 
estimations are consistent. The findings in Table 4 show that all aspects of the index of the 
legal system and property rights are positively associated with the number of tourist arrivals. 
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To put it differently, the higher values for the sub-indexes of the legal system and property 
rights enhance inbound tourism. The marginal impact of regulatory restrictions on the sale of 
real property (0.153) is at the highest level, and the marginal impact on the integrity of the 
legal system is at the lowest level (0.026). In addition, most of the sub-index of the legal 
system and property rights are statistically significant with the exceptions of indices of the 
impartial courts and the integrity of the legal system. We also consider the various robustness 
analyses to check the validity of the baseline findings. 
5. Robustness analysis 
5.1. Different estimation procedures 
Table 5 provides findings from system GMM estimators (Columns I and II) and HT 
estimators (Columns III and IV) to analyse the robustness of the baseline findings to the 
different estimators and the model specifications. To include a potential persistence of 
inbound tourism, we consider the lagged international tourist arrivals following also the 
findings of unit root test. Doing so, we also address a possible endogeneity problem by 
running a system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). According to the findings of the Sargan test, a possible over-identification problem is 
rejected. Furthermore, the findings of the autocorrelation test indicate that there a first-order 
autocorrelation; however, a second-order autocorrelation is not rejected. In short, it is found 
that the necessary assumptions have been satisfied. The coefficient of the lagged inbound 
tourism is 0.71, and it is statistically significant. This evidence indicates the medium-level 
persistency in the international tourist arrivals.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
In addition, the results of the control variables are similar to the baseline findings of 
the fixed-effects estimations, and the coefficients of controls are significant. In Column (I), 
we obtain the coefficient of the legal system and property rights in the natural logarithmic 
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form is positive and statistically significant (0.34). This evidence implies that a 1% rise in the 
legal system and property rights is associated with a 0.34% rise in international tourist 
arrivals. Similarly, in Column (II), we find the coefficient of the legal system and property 
rights in the level form is also positive and statistically significant (0.11). 
 We also attempt to solve a possible omitted variable bias and include the time-
invariant variables (log coast in km, log coastline per total land area, and the dummy variable 
for the landlocked countries). Doing so, we implement the HT estimators to analyse the 
impact of the index of the legal system and property rights on the international tourist arrivals 
and the results are reported in Columns (III) and (IV). Taking the other papers into 
consideration, the per capita income, nominal exchange rate, and trade openness are treated as 
endogenous variables in the HT estimators. The findings of the control variables are similar to 
the baseline regressions, and all main control variables are positively associated with the 
international tourist arrivals and the coefficients are significant. Analysing time-invariant 
controls, the coefficient of the coastline (km) in the natural logarithmic form is found as 
significant (at the 1% level) and it is positively associated with the international tourist 
arrivals. Although the log coastline per total land area and the dummy variable for landlocked 
countries are negatively related to the international tourist arrivals as expected, their 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. Specifically, Column (III) provides that the 
coefficient of the index of the legal system and property rights is positive and statistically 
significant (0.20). This evidence implies that a 1% rise in the index of the legal system and 
property rights press is related to a 0.2% rise in the international tourist arrivals. Similarly, in 
Column (IV), we observe the coefficient of the legal system and property rights in the level 
form is also positive and statistically significant (0.03). Overall, the effects of the legal system 
and property rights on the international tourist arrivals are positive and statistically significant 
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as we tackle a possible endogeneity and the omitted variable problems in model specifications 
by implementing different estimators and adding time-invariant and time-varying controls. 
5.2. Robustness to the outliers  
Table 6 provides the next robustness analyses, which consider another indicator of the 
development of the tourism sector. We use the log of international tourism receipts rather than 
the log of the number of international tourist arrivals. The findings are similar to the baseline 
results that are the index of the legal system and property rights is positively associated with 
the development of the tourism sector.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 We also implement the robustness analysis, which excludes the outlier observations 
for inbound tourism and the index of the legal system and property rights. Following Demir 
and Gozgor (2019), we describe the outliers as observations, “which are more than two 
standard deviations away” from the average. Besides, the effects of the legal system and 
property rights on international tourist arrivals can depend on the countries in different 
regions. Therefore, we count out the observations in Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan 
African countries to check the sensitivity of the baseline findings. Doing so, we run the 
baseline regressions by excluding observations in each continent at one time. Baseline results 
remain robust when we exclude extreme observations and the observations in each continent. 
At this point, the baseline findings are not utilized by extreme observations and are not 
dominated by observations from related regions. 
Overall, the findings of the sensitivity analysis indicate that greater legal system 
quality and better protection of property rights promote inbound tourism and their coefficients 





6. Discussion and policy implications 
The findings imply that for the purpose of developing the tourism industry, countries need to 
enhance the legal system quality and provide better protection of property rights. It is more 
beneficial for the lower-income countries than their OECD counterparts to carry out legal 
reforms since the potential gains are greater for the poorer countries, consistent with the 
findings in Das and Dirienzo (2010) and Posner (1998). 
 In details, a growth in the tourism industry is accompanied with a higher judicial 
independence and a better enforcement of contracts, a lower level of regulation on the 
restrictions on the sale of real property and a lower cost of crime and military interference in 
the rule of law and politics, in line with the previous findings of Moyo and Ziramba (2013) 
and Gozgor et al. (2017).  
Higher judicial independence helps to more effectively solve conflicts and disputes 
when tourists and tourism companies face legal problems. Policymakers may need to increase 
judicial salaries to attract well-educated and honest lawyers. But it would be costly for the 
poorer countries with scarce resources. Alternatively, countries may alter the structure of 
judicial compensation by adjusting up the generous pension that is no longer available if the 
judge is removed from office for incompetence. Another change worth considering is to have 
judges sit in panels rather than by themselves. But it would increase costs, too.  
In countries where the enforcement of contracts is higher, damages are more likely to 
be compensated when tourists and tourism companies want to make claims of infringement of 
legal rights. Posner (1998) suggest adopting a system of efficient rules for the existing 
inefficient institutions to administer, which saves money and time in comparison to heavily 
investing in upgrading the existing legal institutions. For example, policymakers may enact 
rules that certain disputes during tourism seasons can be referred to binding arbitration to 
avoid lengthy judicial procedures, or entitling the winner of a judgment for damages to 
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receive interest from the date the suit was filed to bypass the cumbersome judicial discussions. 
The poorer countries may adopt foreign laws from well-structured economies and adjust them 
to fit into local customs since there is no need to start from scratch.  
Lower regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property can increase tourism-related 
business activities, such as building hotels and facilities like shopping malls and making 
estate sales to foreigners.  As a result, the number of relatives and friends from their countries 
can be expected to increase. Policymakers may need to simplify the regulatory procedure of 
selling properties to foreigners. However, these decisions should be made with caution as 
foreign procurement of lands may raise costly concerns.  A higher crime leads to an increase 
in the costs since firms in the tourism sector can demand a higher insurance premium to cover 
the cost of possible crime incidents (Moyo and Ziramba, 2013). The increase in the weight of 
the military in social life can create ambiguity and uneasiness and tourists can dismantle their 
travels to these countries (Gozgor et al., 2017). In addition, countries with strong military 
interventions can channel resources from tourism investments to finance military activities 
that will lead to a reduction in tourism investments and infrastructure spending in tourism 
(Weaver, 2011). Policymakers may consider applying strict criminal laws and controlling 
military-related activities during the tourist seasons. Once again, the country-specific 
conditions need to be meticulously analysed before any decisions are made.  
 Briefly speaking, there is a range of approaches for policymakers of various countries 
to consider if they want to achieve a higher level of legal system quality and better protection 
of property rights to enhance the tourism industry. They need to understand there is a trade-
off between benefits and costs and make decisions based on the specific conditions in a 





In this paper, we examined the effects of the legal system and the protection of property rights 
on inbound tourism in the panel dataset of 152 countries for the period from 1995 to 2015. 
For this purpose, we implemented not only the fixed-effects estimators but also the system 
GMM estimators to solve a possible endogeneity problem. We also utilized the Hausman–
Taylor method to solve a potential omitted variable problem. In addition, we used several 
model specifications, and the findings show that promoting the efficiency of the legal system 
and the protection of property rights is positively associated with inbound tourism. We also 
performed several robustness checks and analysed the economies at the different development 
level. We also addressed a potential omitted variable problem by considering various 
geographical and macroeconomic controls. Furthermore, we focused on the sub-indexes of the 
legal system and property rights. Finally, we performed various robustness analyses by 
excluding outlier observations and excluding countries in different continents. Our baseline 
results are robust to perform all of these robustness analyses and the sensitivity check. 
In countries with higher efficiency of the legal system and property rights, legal 
institutions can quickly and rightly protect the civil rights and property of all individuals from 
aggressive manners. Therefore, enhancing the well-defined property rights of individuals 
(especially foreigners) can be a significant policy tool to promote inbound tourism. The 
current paper does not actually suggest that tourists take the legal system and property rights 
into account when they choose their destinations, but enhancing institutional quality may 
work in attracting more international tourists. Overall, the results indicate that a higher 
efficiency of the legal system and property rights can be a significant policy tool for providing 
the sustainability of tourism development. Future studies can focus on specific large 
economies (e.g. China, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to investigate the impact 
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Table 1. Descriptive Summary Statistics 
Variables Definition   Data Source      Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
International Tourism: Number of Tourist Arrivals Logarithmic Form World Bank, World Development Indicators 14.06 1.846 7.972 18.24 2,381 
Legal System and Property Rights Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.666 0.336 0.150 2.260 2,209 
Judicial Independence Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.483 0.569 –1.790 2.280 1,840 
Impartial Courts Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.478 0.402 –0.690 2.270 2,205 
Protection of Property Rights Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.629 0.391 –0.140 2.260 1,858 
Military Interference in Rule of Law and Politics Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.745 0.600 –1.970 2.230 2,198 
Integrity of the Legal System Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.755 0.434 –1.790 2.230 1,979 
Legal Enforcement of Contracts Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.398 0.525 –1.210 2.230 1,792 
Regulatory Restrictions on the Sale of Real Property Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.891 0.425 –0.920 2.230 1,673 
Reliability of Police Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.624 0.398 0.190 2.260 1,330 
Business Costs of Crime Logarithmic Form Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom: Gwartney et al. (2018) 1.715 0.394 0.060 2.270 1,330 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita (Current USD) Logarithmic Form World Bank, World Development Indicators 8.435 1.575 4.751 11.62 2,488 
Nominal Exchange Rate (Domestic Currency per USD) Logarithmic Form World Bank, World Development Indicators 3.290 2.729 –5.896 22.62 2,270 
Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports as Share of GDP) Logarithmic Form World Bank, World Development Indicators 4.338 0.629 –1.771 6.092 2,463 
Number of Heritage Level United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 4.853 6.961 0.000 52.00 1,968 
Total Surface Area (km2) Logarithmic Form Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 10.94 2.073 5.768 16.65 2,510 
Total Land Area (km2) Logarithmic Form Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 11.90 2.074 5.768 16.61 2,510 
Coastline (km) Logarithmic Form Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 7.069 1.756 1.411 12.21 1,969 
Coastline per Total Land Area Logarithmic Form Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 1.240 14.73 0.000 185.2 2,512 
Landlocked Countries Dummy Variable Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 0.216 0.411 0.000 1.000 2,512 















Table 2. Results of the Benchmark Fixed-Effects Estimators  
Explanatory Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Log Gross Domestic Product per Capita – 1.529*** 1.524*** 1.519*** 1.528*** 1.539*** 
 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Log Nominal Exchange Rate – 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log Trade Openness – 0.192*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 0.193*** 0.195*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Log Total Land Area (km2) – – 8.383*** – – – 
   (1.965)    
Log Surface Land Area (km2) – – – 8.701*** – – 
    (1.962)   
Number of Heritage – – –  0.803 – 
     (0.954)  
Legal System and Property Rights (Log)  0.539*** 0.179*** 0.180*** 0.183*** 0.181*** – 
 (0.074) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)  
Legal System and Property Rights (Level) – – – – – 0.029** 
 
     (0.014) 
Constant Term 13.37*** 0.005 –100.9*** –105.0*** 11.43*** 0.041 
 (0.074) (0.388) (23.67) (23.70) (0.074) (0.388) 
Observations 2,134 1,859 1,857 1,857 1,853 1,859 
Number of Countries 154 152 150 150 150 152 
R-squared 0.026 0.440 0.446 0.446 0.441 0.438 
Robust Hausman Test 27.4 [0.00] 
36.2 





Notes: Dependent variable is the log number of tourist arrivals. The robust standard errors clustered at the country levels are in the parentheses. The year 
fixed-effects and the country fixed-effects are included in the regressions. The probability values are in the brackets. *** and ** indicate the statistical 







Table 3. Results of the Benchmark Fixed-Effects Estimators: Different Country Groups 
Explanatory  
Variables 






























Log Gross Domestic Product per Capita 1.715*** 1.718*** 1.363*** 1.368*** 1.547*** 1.556*** 1.310*** 1.309*** 
 
(0.096) (0.095) (0.048) (0.048) (0.055) (0.054) (0.102) (0.101) 
Log Nominal Exchange Rate 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.011) (0.011) (0.043) (0.042) 
Log Trade Openness 0.143*** 0.144* 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.186*** 0.189*** 0.348*** 0.340*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.057) (0.057) (0.036) (0.036) (0.102) (0.102) 
Legal System and Property Rights (Log) 0.184** – 0.111** – 0.299*** – 0.276** – 
 (0.086)  (0.051)  (0.067)  (0.133)  
Legal System and Property Rights (Level) – 0.048* – 0.025* – 0.049* – 0.044* 
  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Observations 793 793 1,066 1,066 1,449 1,449 360 360 
Number of Countries 64 64 88 88 117 117 35 35 
R-squared 0.389 0.387 0.534 0.532 0.431 0.429 0.545 0.545 









Notes: Dependent variable is the log number of tourist arrivals. The constant term is included in the regressions, but the coefficients are not reported. The 
robust standard errors clustered at the country levels are in the parentheses. The year fixed-effects and the country fixed-effects are included in the regressions. 










Table 4. Results of the Benchmark Fixed-Effects Estimators: Sub-indexes of the Legal System and Property Rights 
Explanatory Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) 
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Log Gross Domestic Product per Capita 1.481*** 1.556*** 1.388*** 1.573*** 1.495*** 1.601*** 1.573*** 1.552*** 1.551*** 
 
(0.043) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.168) (0.189) (0.197) (0.199) 
 
Log Nominal Exchange Rate 0.064*** 0.051*** 0.061*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Log Trade Openness 0.318*** 0.199*** 0.298*** 0.206*** 0.168*** 0.439*** 0.350*** 0.106* 0.106* 
 (0.045) (0.033) (0.045) (0.033) (0.031) (0.105) (0.109) (0.062) (0.063) 
Log Judicial Independence 0.146*** – – – – – – – – 
 (0.028)         
Log Impartial Courts – 0.029 – – – – – – – 
  (0.040)        
Log Protection of Property Rights – – 0.142*** – – – – – – 
   (0.035)       
Log Military Interference in Rule of Law and Politics – – – 0.119* – – – – – 
    (0.061)      
Log Integrity of the Legal System – – – – 0.026 – – – – 
     (0.041)     
Log Legal Enforcement of Contracts – – – – – 0.138* – – – 
 
     (0.077)    
Log Regulatory Restrictions on the Sale of Real Property – – – – – – 0.153** – – 
       (0.070)   
Log Reliability of Police – – – – – – – 0.152** – 
        (0.063)  
Log Business Costs of Crime – – – – – – – – 0.098** 
         (0.041) 
Observations 1,541 1,855 1,559 1,859 1,638 1,499 1,399 1,105 1,105 
Number of Countries 143 152 145 152 136 139 139 132 132 
R-squared 0.517 0.439 0.514 0.445 0.454 0.398 0.387 0.398 0.394 
Robust Hausman Test 29.2 [0.00] 24.9 [0.00] 25.7 [0.00] 24.5 [0.00] 21.8 [0.00] 23.6 [0.00] 22.3 [0.00] 27.1 [0.00] 26.2 [0.00] 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log number of tourist arrivals. The constant term is included in the regressions, but the coefficients are not reported. The 
robust standard errors clustered at the country levels are in the parentheses. The year fixed-effects and the country fixed-effects are included in the regressions. 
The probability values are in the brackets. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Results of the Benchmark Regressions: System GMM and the Hausman–Taylor Estimators 




Notes: Dependent variable is the log number of tourist arrivals. The constant term is included in the regressions, but the coefficients are not reported. The 
robust standard errors clustered at the country levels are in the parentheses. The probability values are in the brackets. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Findings of the Robustness Checks and the Sensitivity Analysis 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Lagged Log Tourist Arrivals 0.701*** 0.713*** – – 
 
(0.082) (0.083)   
Log Gross Domestic Product per Capita 0.667*** 0.651*** 1.514*** 1.513*** 
 
(0.169) (0.172) (0.049) (0.048) 
Log Nominal Exchange Rate 0.062* 0.079* 0.046** 0.049** 
 
(0.032) (0.042) (0.020) (0.020) 
Log Trade Openness 0.542*** 0.561*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.034) (0.034) 
Log Coastline (km) – – 0.492*** 0.529*** 
   (0.177) (0.193) 
Log Coastline per Total Land Area – – –0.002 –0.002 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Landlocked Countries – – –0.580 –0.642 
   (0.534) (0.539) 




Legal System and Property Rights (Level) – 0.110** – 0.032** 
  (0.043)  (0.014) 
Observations 1,494 1,494 1,482 1,482 
Number of Countries 139 139 118 118 
Wald-chi2 3232.5 2917.2 1257.1 1242.1 
AR (1) Test p-value  [0.000]  [0.000] – – 
AR (2) Test p-value  [0.293]  [0.271] – – 
Sargan Statistic p-value  [0.255]  [0.267] – – 
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Notes: Dependent variable is the log number of tourist arrivals. The constant term, the log gross domestic product per capita, the log nominal exchange rate, 
and the log trade openness are estimated but their coefficients are not reported. The year fixed-effects and the country fixed-effects are also included in the 
regressions. The robust standard errors clustered at the country levels are in the parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 









Appendix A. List of Countries in the Dataset 
 
Type of Analysis Variables All Countries 
Results of the Benchmark Regressions 
Legal System and Property Rights (Log) 0.179*** (0.061) 
Legal System and Property Rights (Level) 0.029** (0.014) 
Different Measures of Tourism Development: Log Tourism Receipts 
Legal System and Property Rights (Log) 0.235*** (0.076) 
Legal System and Property Rights (Level) 0.041** (0.017) 
Excluding the Extreme Units of Log Tourist Arrivals 
Legal System and Property Rights (Log) 0.190*** (0.058) 
Legal System and Property Rights (Level) 0.033** (0.013) 
Excluding the Extreme Units of Legal System and Property Rights Measures 
Legal System and Property Rights (Log) 0.187*** (0.069) 
Legal System and Property Rights (Level) 0.021* (0.011) 
Excluding the Latin American and Caribbean Countries 
Legal System and Property Rights (Log) 0.205*** (0.075) 
Legal System and Property Rights (Level) 0.033* (0.017) 
Excluding the East and South Asian Countries 
Legal System and Property Rights (Log) 0.185*** (0.063) 
Legal System and Property Rights (Level) 0.029** (0.014) 
Excluding the Sub-Saharan African Countries 
Legal System and Property Rights (Log) 0.123** (0.061) 




88 High-income Countries (Those with a Gross National Income (GNI) per Capita Higher than $3,956) 
 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas The, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, 
Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German, Greece, Guyana, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea 
Republic, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Namibia, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
64 Low-income Countries (Those with a GNI per Capita Less than $3,956) 
 
Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia The, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen Republic, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
